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Civil servants have a bad reputation of being lazy. However, citizens' personal experiences 
with civil servants appear to be significantly better. We develop a model of an economy in 
which workers differ in laziness and in public service motivation, and characterise optimal 
incentive contracts for public sector workers under different informational assumptions. 
When civil servants' effort is unverifiable, lazy workers find working in the public sector 
highly attractive and may crowd out workers with a public service motivation. When effort is 
verifiable, the government optimally attracts motivated workers as well as the economy's 
laziest workers by offering separating contracts, which are both distorted. Even though 
contract distortions reduce aggregate welfare, a majority of society may be better off as public 
goods come at a lower cost. 
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them, bureaucrats are lethargic, incompetent hacks who spend their days
spinning out reels of red tape and reams of paperwork, all the while going to
great lengths to avoid doing the job they were hired to do."J a m e sQ .W i l s o n
(1989), p. x.
1 Introduction
Bureaucrats have a bad reputation. Jokes about bureaucrats’ laziness and
stories on bureaucratic errors abound. The lack of monetary incentives at
public organisations is supposed to attract workers who are most averse to
exerting eﬀort. This pessimistic view is also prominent in the economics
literature. For several decades, the literature has identiﬁed bureaucrats as
pursuing their narrow self-interest, usually being at odds with the interest
of society (see Tullock, 1965, Downs, 1967, Niskanen, 1971, and Buchanan,
1978).
However, when citizens are asked for their personal experience with pub-
lic agencies, many tend to be satisﬁed with the performance of the agency.
Customers’ evaluation of a speciﬁc agency or civil servant is signiﬁcantly bet-
ter than their evaluation of the government or bureaucrats in general (Katz
et al., 1975, Goodsell, 1985). Hence, as Wilson (1989) phrases it: "...those
lazy, incompetent bureaucrats must work for some other agency..."( p .x ) .
This suggests that at least some civil servants do not ﬁtt h es t e r e o t y p e .I ti s
also in line with a number of recent papers stressing the importance of ‘pub-
lic service motivation’ for incentive schemes and workers’ eﬀort in the public
sector (Francois, 2000, Dixit, 2002, Delfgaauw and Dur, 2002b, Besley and
Ghatak, 2003, Prendergast, 2003, Glazer, 2004).
How to reconcile these seemingly opposing points of view? This paper
develops a model with three types of workers: regular, motivated, and lazy
workers. Compared to regular workers, lazy workers have higher cost of
eﬀort in both the private and the public sector. Motivated workers, to some
extent, enjoy exerting eﬀort in a public sector job, but are otherwise identical
to regular workers. This public service motivation gives monopsony power
to the government. We show that it is in the interest of a cost-minimising
government to attract, besides motivated workers, lazy workers rather than
regular workers.
Whereas we model the private sector as a competitive market in which
workers are paid their full marginal product, the public sector is assumed to
be a single organisation whose objective is to produce a certain amount of
public goods at minimum cost. This organisation, which we refer to as the
public ﬁrm, attracts workers by oﬀering one or more contracts specifying the
wage and, if veriﬁable, required eﬀort. The public ﬁrm can not observe the
workers’ type and, hence, can not make the contracts contingent on worker
1type. Workers choose the contract that yields them the highest utility,
provided that the private sector is not a better option.
We consider two cases: veriﬁable and unveriﬁable eﬀort. When eﬀort
is unveriﬁable, the public ﬁrm prefers to attract either motivated or lazy
workers. We show that it may occur that the public ﬁrm prefers to attract
only motivated workers, but that it can not avoid hiring lazy workers as
well. However, if desired public production is suﬃciently large, the public
ﬁrm wants to attract both motivated and lazy workers, implying that the
problem of nonexcludability of lazy workers is less severe.
When eﬀort is veriﬁable and desired production in the public sector
is suﬃciently small, the public ﬁrm attracts only motivated workers, and
extracts all motivational rents from these workers. This full rent extraction
may not be possible if a second worker type is needed. Any rents motivated
workers obtain when they would choose the other type’s contract can not
be extracted by the public ﬁrm. Since a contract satisfying a lazy worker’s
participation constraint has lower wage and lower required eﬀort than a
regular worker’s contract, a lazy worker’s contract is less appealing to the
motivated workers. Therefore, the public ﬁrm can extract more motivational
rents, and hence attracts motivated workers at lower cost, if it attracts lazy
workers rather than regular workers.
The public ﬁrm distorts both contracts in order to extract even more
motivational rents. It oﬀers lower-powered incentives to lazy workers than
do private ﬁrms. This way, the lazy worker’s contract becomes even less
appealing to the motivated workers. However, to keep production at the
desired level, this implies that the public ﬁrm has to hire additional lazy
workers, which is costly. These costs can be reduced by giving motivated
workers higher-powered incentives, above the level private ﬁrms would oﬀer.
These contract distortions are cost-eﬃcient, but reduce social welfare. If
we impose that the public ﬁrm maximises social welfare rather than min-
imises cost, it does not distort the contracts of the workers. Still, the public
ﬁrm prefers to attract motivated workers, but if a second worker type is
needed, it is indiﬀerent between lazy and regular workers. Compared to a
cost-minimising public ﬁrm, social welfare is higher. However, total cost of
public goods production and, hence, taxes are also higher when the pub-
lic ﬁrm maximises social welfare. Only motivated workers beneﬁt, whereas
the utility of lazy and regular workers decreases as a result of higher taxes.
When motivated workers are a minority in society, politicians are likely to
strive for cost-minimisation rather than for social welfare maximisation, so
as to please the public at large.
While there has been quite some empirical research showing that a sig-
niﬁcant part of the civil work force has a public service motivation,1 there
1The literature is not fully conclusive (Wright, 2001), but the emerging picture is
that civil servants are less motivated by high pay than their private sector counterparts,
2Table 1: Percentage of workers moving from the private sector to
the public sector and vice versa who mention workload as one of
the three most important reasons to leave their job (The Nether-
lands, 2002).
Workload Respondents
Sector Inﬂow Outﬂow Inﬂow Outﬂow
Central 16.3 1.7 307 171
Local 18.5 6.7 649 251
Police 9.4 2.3 483 104
Hospitals1 12.9 10.7 51 45
Research2 13.0 11.7 116 52
Defence 3.7 4.7 185 171
Education 15.3 27.0 429 146
1 Only university hospitals are surveyed.
2 Research consists of universities and research institutes.
Data source: BZK, Mobiliteitsonderzoek 2002.
exists little evidence conﬁrming the stereotype view that civil servants are
more averse to exerting eﬀort than workers in the private sector. Our model
implies that for lazy workers, the attractive feature of working in the public
sector is that the workload is relatively low, either because eﬀort is unveriﬁ-
able, or because weak incentives are provided. In 2002, the Dutch Ministry
of the Interior and Kingdom Relations undertook a survey of workers who
had recently entered or left the public sector. In Table 1, we list the per-
centage of workers moving between the private and the public sector who
mentioned workload as one of the three most important reasons to leave
their job. Except for Defence and Education, workers who moved from the
private sector to the public sector mention workload more often than work-
ers who moved in the opposite direction. The diﬀerence is most pronounced
for central government and local governments. Education is the main excep-
tion. This may be due to the shortage of teachers in The Netherlands, or it
may indicate that our model does not apply to all jobs in the public sector.
If we restrict our sample to people who worked full-time at both jobs, the
results provide even stronger support for our predictions, at the expense of
and have stronger intrinsic motivation (Houston, 2000, Jurkiewicz et al., 1998, Karl and
Sutton, 1998). Heckman et al. (1996) also ﬁnd evidence for intrinsic motivation of public
sector workers. They study the introduction of a monetary incentive scheme for training
centers under the Job Training Partnership Act. Rather than cream skimming, case
workers accepted the least employable applicants into the program. The authors argue
that case workers’ “social service mentality...”g i v e st h e m“ ...a strong desire to aid the
least well oﬀ.”( p .2 ) .
3a smaller number of observations.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses how the
paper relates to the literature. Section 3 describes the model. In Section
4, we analyse a benchmark case where worker type is observable. Section 5
deals with the case where worker type is unobservable. Section 6 compares
our results with the case where the public ﬁrm maximises social welfare
rather than minimise costs. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our model is related to the literature on screening of workers’ ability follow-
ing the seminal papers by Spence (1973) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)
(for an overview, see Riley, 2001). In a standard adverse selection model
(see e.g. Laﬀont and Martimort, 2002), a ﬁrm induces the ‘low’ type to
exert a suboptimally low level of eﬀort, so as to extract more of the rents
from the ‘high’ type. The contract of the ‘high’ type is eﬃcient. In con-
trast, in our model the contracts of both types are distorted. Whereas in
the standard model a ﬁrm designs contracts for a ﬁxed number of workers,
our model describes the behaviour of a ﬁrm which has to meet a production
requirement.2
Heterogeneity in laziness may stem from diﬀerences in people’s physical
ﬁtness or ability, as in the standard adverse selection model, but may also
stem from heterogeneity in general work ethic or morale. Diﬀerences in work
ethic have been associated with, for instance, personality traits (Furnham,
1992) and cultural factors (Hofstede, 1991). Companies deem these diﬀer-
ences important, as can be seen from the widespread use of personality tests
to select from the pool of job applicants (see Jenkins (2001) for the UK and
Ryan et al. (1999) for an international comparison of selection methods).
Theoretical work by Stowe (2002) shows that higher morale leads to higher
eﬀort of the worker, but does not necessarily translate into a higher wage.
A new strand in the economics literature emphasises that workers in
public organisations (or, more generally, in non-proﬁt organisations) may
be intrinsically motivated to work. For instance, Dixit (2002) argues that
organisations that have an idealistic or ethical purpose may be attractive to
workers who share these goals. Besley and Ghatak (2003) show that a good
match between an organisation’s and a worker’s mission may reduce the need
for monetary incentives. Francois (2000) and Glazer (2004) develop models
where workers intrinsically value the output of the public organisation, see
also Preston (1989). In Benabou and Tirole (2003) and Delfgaauw and
Dur (2002b), as in this paper, workers may enjoy exerting eﬀo r ta tw o r k
or intrinsically value their contribution to output (‘warm-glow’). The main
2It is easy to extend our model to allow for price-elastic demand for the public good.
Then, as in the case of a production requirement, both contracts are distorted.
4diﬀerence between our paper and earlier work is that we relax the assumption
that types of agents are fully observed by the principal.3
Most related to our work is a recent paper by Prendergast (2003). He as-
sumes that workers diﬀer in altruism for clients. The government prefers to
attract diﬀerent worker types for diﬀerent agencies. For agencies where the
preferences of the government and clients are aligned, as in health care, the
government prefers the most altruistic bureaucrats. However, when the pref-
erences of the government and clients are not aligned, as with (suspected)
criminals, bureaucrats should be biased against their clients. Prendergast
shows that, when agents’ types are unobservable, agencies are likely to at-
tract both the most preferred and the least preferred workers. The latter
enter the agency because they beneﬁt most from diverting from the govern-
ment’s most preferred policy.
Our work also relates to Lazear (1986). He argues that ﬁrms can use
their wage policy so as to attract certain types of workers, just like the public
ﬁrm in our model does. Strong monetary incentives induce highly productive
workers to apply at a ﬁrm, whereas less productive workers prefer a high base
salary and weak incentives (see also Lazear, 1995, and Prendergast, 1999,
for surveys). Moen and Rosen (2001) have recently built on this and argue
that, when there is a multi-tasking problem, competition between ﬁrms for
highly productive workers may result in too high-powered incentives from
a social welfare perspective. Burgess and Metcalfe (1999) show empirically
that private companies make far more use of incentive wages than public
organisations. Moreover, they argue that there are insuﬃcient grounds to
justify the low incentivisation of the public sector. Our model implies that
lazy workers get indeed weaker monetary incentives at the public ﬁrm com-
pared to the private sector, and suggests that this may be cost-eﬃcient. On
the other hand, motivated workers get stronger incentives.
A few papers consider heterogeneity in ability among government work-
ers in the context of downsizing the government (Jeon and Laﬀont, 1999,
and Rama, 1999). Jeon and Laﬀont (1999) show that the optimal volun-
tary downsizing mechanism consists of a menu of public wages, severance
pay, and probabilities of dismissal. The government’s choice which workers
to retain closely resembles our results in Section 6, where we impose that
the government maximises social welfare. When workers diﬀer in a sector-
speciﬁc trait, the government prefers the workers that have a comparative
advantage in the public sector, whereas when workers diﬀer in a general
trait, the government is indiﬀerent. Our paper diﬀers in three important
3This paper builds on previous work. In Delfgaauw and Dur (2002a), we examine
the implications of workers’ intrinsic motivation for optimal monetary incentive schemes
and show that by oﬀe r i n gah i g h e rw a g e ,aﬁrm may attract less motivated workers.
In Delfgaauw and Dur (2002b), we analyse the consequences of deregulation of a sector
previously dominated by a public ﬁrm, assuming that workers diﬀer in their intrinsic
motivation to work in the sector.
5aspects. First, we consider a model in which workers are heterogeneous
both in general and in sector-speciﬁc productivity, whereas Jeon and Laf-
font study heterogeneity in general and in sector-speciﬁc productivity sepa-
rately. We show that heterogeneity in sector-speciﬁc motivation implies that
a cost-minimising government is not indiﬀerent between workers who diﬀer
in general work ethic. Second, in their model, eﬀort is ﬁxed, implying that
they do not consider optimal incentive schemes. Third, most of our anal-
ysis focuses on a cost-minimising government rather than a social welfare
maximising government.
3T h e M o d e l
There are two sectors in the economy, a private and a public sector. The
private sector is a fully competitive market where workers receive their full
marginal product. The public sector is run by a single entity, which can be
thought of as the government. This single organisation will be referred to
as the public ﬁrm. Both sectors have the same linear production function:
q(e)=e (1)
where q is production and e is eﬀort. Each unit of production of the private
sector can be sold on the world market for the exogenous price p.T h e
public ﬁrm produces public goods, which are therefore not priced. The
desired amount of public production is given by Q.4 First, we assume that
the public ﬁrm minimises cost of production. Next, we compare the results
with a social welfare-maximising public ﬁrm. We abstract from principal-
agent problems between voters, politicians, and managers of the public ﬁrm,
which implies that the objective of the public ﬁrm is in line with the interest
of (a majority of) the voters.
Three types of workers exist in the economy: regular workers r,m o t i -
vated workers m, and lazy workers l. The number of workers of each type in
the economy is given by Ni, i ∈ {r,m,l}. Lazy workers incur a greater disu-
tility from working than the other worker types. Motivated workers derive
intrinsic utility from exerting eﬀort in the public sector, but are otherwise
identical to regular workers.5
The utility of a worker of type i from working in the private sector is
given by:
Ui = w − θiC(e) (2)
4Price-elastic demand for public goods would not alter any of the results qualitatively.
By varying the level of Q, our analysis yields the supply function for public goods. To-
gether, demand and supply then determine the optimal level of Q.
5Allowing for worker types with private sector motivation does not change the results,
as these workers would seek employment in the public sector only when wages in the public
sector are very high.
6where w is the wage, C(e) describes the cost of eﬀort, with properties C(0) =
0, C0(·) > 0,a n dC00(·) > 0,a n dθi measures the degree of laziness. We
assume that 0 <θ r = θm <θ l.
The utility of a worker of type i from working in the public sector is
given by:6
Ui = w + γiV (e) − θiC(e) (3)
where V (e) is a concave function with properties V (0) = 0, V 0(·) > 0 and
V 00(·) < 0,a n dγi measures the public service motivation of a worker. We
assume that γm >γ r = γl =0 . Hence, only motivated workers derive
utility from exerting eﬀort in the public sector. Motivated workers have an
action-oriented motivation, as in Benabou and Tirole (2003) and Delfgaauw
and Dur (2002a, 2002b). Since q = e, results are the same if we assume that
motivated workers intrinsically value their contribution to output (‘warm-
glow’). As motivated workers derive motivational utility only at the public
ﬁrm, the ﬁrm has monopsony power over these workers.7
Competition in the private sector ensures that workers in the private
sector receive their full marginal product. Hence, total wage of a worker of
type i is given by pei. It follows from (1) and (2) that the optimal level of
eﬀort e∗












i is decreasing in θi.
For future reference, we derive the level of eﬀort motivated workers would
exert in the private sector if they would have intrinsic motivation to work
in the private sector. This level of eﬀort, denoted by ex








In the public sector, we distinguish two cases, veriﬁable eﬀort and un-
veriﬁable eﬀort. If eﬀort is veriﬁable, the public ﬁrm oﬀers one or more
contracts in which both the level of eﬀo r ta n dt h ew a g ea r es p e c i ﬁed. In the
6We assume that workers are employed either in the private or in the public sector.
Allowing for part-time jobs in the private sector increases the distortions in the optimal
contracts when worker types are unobservable. We also abstract from subcontracting,
thereby ruling out that a motivated worker takes over the contracts of two or more lazy
workers at the public ﬁrm.
7Allowing for a fourth type of worker, who derives motivational utility from working
in the public sector, but is lazy as well (γ = γm, θ = θl)d o e sn o ta ﬀect the results, unless
there are much more lazy motivated workers than regular motivated workers and γm is
very low compared to θl − θr.
7second case, eﬀort (and output) is unveriﬁable above a certain level of e, ¯ e.8
We assume that ¯ e is suﬃciently small such that it is a binding restriction
for lazy and regular workers. This requires that ¯ e<e ∗
l . Then, the public
ﬁr mc a no n l yo ﬀer a contract in which a wage level is speciﬁed, along with
the threat not to pay the wage if eﬀort is below ¯ e.
Wages in the public sector are ﬁnanced through a lump-sum (non-distortionary)
tax, uniformly levied on all workers in the economy. This implies that we
can ignore taxation when deriving the optimal occupational and eﬀort choice
of the workers.
4 Benchmark: Observable Types
Suppose that the public ﬁrm can distinguish between the diﬀerent types.
Then workers are unable to opt for a contract designed for another type,
and the public ﬁrm can tailor the contract to each worker type.
4.1 Unveriﬁable Eﬀort
When eﬀort levels above ¯ e are unveriﬁable, lazy and regular workers opti-
mally choose to exert exactly eﬀort level ¯ e. Motivated workers may decide to
exert more eﬀort than ¯ e, which occurs when the level of eﬀort e m implicitly




is greater than ¯ e.






The minimum wage wi at which the public ﬁrm can attract a worker of type
i is given by the participation constraint:
wi = U∗
i + θiC(ei) − γiV (ei) (8)











i)+C(¯ e) < 0
8¯ e reﬂects that workers who do not show up at work or remain idle behind their desk
all day can be detected and are ﬁred. When ¯ e =0 , no extrinsic incentives can be provided,
implying that public goods production has to rely completely on intrinsic motivation.
8where the ﬁr s tt e r md r o p so u tu s i n gﬁrst-order condition (4). The inequality
follows from the restriction ¯ e<e ∗
i. Hence, the public ﬁrm prefers lazy
workers to regular workers. Lazy workers value the relatively low level of
eﬀort in the public sector more than regular workers and, hence, demand
a lower wage. The same holds for motivated workers, but for a diﬀerent
reason: They require a lower wage than regular workers, as they derive
motivational utility from working in the public sector. Moreover, motivated
workers may exert more eﬀort than regular workers, em ≥ ¯ e.N o t e t h a t
when the optimal level of eﬀort of motivated workers em is greater than ¯ e,i t
holds that θmC(em)−γmV (em) <θ mC(¯ e)−γmV (¯ e). Hence, the higher the
optimal level of eﬀort of motivated workers, the lower the wage needs to be
to attract them. Whether the public ﬁrm prefers motivated workers to lazy
workers is ambiguous. Motivated workers may exert more eﬀort and need
less monetary compensation for their eﬀort, but have higher opportunity
cost of working in the public sector than lazy workers. If Q is suﬃciently
large such that the public ﬁrm needs to hire two worker types, it hires both
lazy and motivated workers.9
4.2 Veriﬁable Eﬀort
When eﬀort is veriﬁable, the public ﬁrm can induce the workers to exert a
certain level of eﬀort, and compensate them such that their participation
constraint (8) is just met. Consider ﬁrst the case where Q is suﬃciently
small, such that the ﬁrm needs only one worker type. Given the type of
worker, the optimal contract then minimises (7) with respect to ei, subject
to the participation constraint (8) and the production constraint Q = eini.
This gives ﬁrst-order condition:
£









In the optimum, the marginal cost of eﬀort by the employed workers (the ﬁrst
term) is equal to the marginal cost of eﬀo r tb yh i r i n ga na d d i t i o n a lw o r k e r
(the second term). Using (4) and (5), it is easy to verify that condition (9)
is satisﬁed for lazy workers and for regular workers if ei = e∗
i.H e n c e ,i ft h e
public ﬁrm chooses to hire lazy or regular workers, it induces them to exert
as much eﬀort as they do in the private sector. By (8), this implies that
the public ﬁrm has to pay them the same wage as they earn in the private
sector, pe∗
i. When we substitute em = e∗
m into equation (9) for i = m,w e
9In Appendix A1 we prove that for each case considered in the main text, there exists
a level of Q for which it is optimal for the public ﬁrm to attract two worker types instead
of one. For each case considered, the supply function of public goods is continuous but
d i s p l a y sak i n ka tt h i sl e v e lo fQ, except when worker types are not observable and eﬀort
is unveriﬁable. Then, the supply function for public goods displays a discontinuous jump
at this level of Q.





where the inequality follows from the concavity of V (e). Hence, motivated
workers are induced to exert less eﬀort than in the private sector, even
though their intrinsic motivation makes them willing to exert more eﬀort at
the same wage than in the private sector. The intuition is straightforward.
As the marginal rents from motivation of a single worker decrease in em,i t
is optimal for the public ﬁrm to set em relatively low and attract additional
motivated workers. Thereby, the public ﬁrm increases the total rents from
motivation generated in the public sector, resulting in lower costs of public
goods production.10
Comparing the cost per unit of eﬀort for each worker type, it follows that
the public ﬁrm prefers to hire motivated workers. It has to pay lazy and
regular workers as much for their eﬀort as the private sector does, which
implies that total cost would be pQ. Even if the public ﬁrm would let
motivated workers work as hard as they do in the private sector, total cost
would be lower than pQ,n a m e l ypQ − nmγmV (e∗
m),a st h eﬁrm can fully
extract the rents from motivation. Since the ﬁrm optimally sets em <e ∗
m,
it follows that total cost are even lower.
If Q is suﬃciently large, such that the public ﬁrm needs workers of a
second type, it is indiﬀerent between lazy and regular workers, as it has to
pay p for each unit of eﬀort of both types. In Appendix A1, we derive that,
in this case, motivated workers are induced to exert more eﬀort than if they
would be employed in the private sector. The public ﬁrm sets em = ex
m,
where ex
m is the level of eﬀort motivated workers would exert in the private
sector if they would have intrinsic motivation to work in the private sector,
as deﬁned by (6). This level of eﬀort maximises the joint surplus of the public
ﬁrm and the motivated workers. Total cost of public goods production are:
Z = pQ − NmγmV (ex
m) (10)
The public ﬁrm optimally designs the contracts such that it pays p per unit
of eﬀort and extracts all of the rents from motivation from the motivated
workers.
5 Unobservable Types
Next consider the case where the public ﬁrm can not distinguish between
worker types. When eﬀort is veriﬁable, the public ﬁrm can separate the
types by clever design of contracts. When eﬀort is not veriﬁable, separating
contracts are not feasible, and crowding out of the desired type may occur.
10It is easy to verify that if V (e) would be a linear function, the public ﬁrm optimally




The eﬀort choice of the workers, the wage needed to attract workers of a
particular type, and the public ﬁrm’s preference ordering over worker types
are the same as in Section 4.1. Hence, regular workers are least attractive,
and lazy and motivated workers may both be the best option. However, as
the ﬁrm can not distinguish between types, it is possible that the ﬁrm prefers
to attract only motivated workers, but that at the wage it has to oﬀer to
attract them, lazy workers apply as well. This occurs when wl/¯ e>w m/em
and wl <w m,w h e r ewi is deﬁned by (8).11 Then, setting wm rather than
wl is optimal if:
wl/¯ e>w m
Nl + Nm
Nl¯ e + Nmem
where we assume that, when setting wm, the public ﬁrm randomly attracts
workers from the groups of motivated and lazy workers, and that utility
from public goods is linear. Hence, for a larger range of parameter values,
it is optimal to attract lazy workers only. With concave utility from public
goods, the condition becomes even more stringent as total public output
becomes uncertain when the ﬁrm sets wm.
Crowding out of motivated workers may also happen when Q is suf-
ﬁciently large, such that the public ﬁrm would like to attract all of the
motivated workers in the economy and a limited number of lazy workers.
Then, as the public ﬁrm can not distinguish between lazy and motivated
workers, some of the motivated workers may not obtain a public sector job.
Compared to the case where worker type is observable, costs of production
are always higher, as the ﬁrm can no longer oﬀer diﬀerent wages to lazy and
motivated workers.
5.2 Veriﬁable Eﬀort
When eﬀort is veriﬁable, the public ﬁrm oﬀers several contracts, so as to
separate worker types. Consider ﬁrst the case where Q is suﬃciently small,
such that the public ﬁrm needs only one worker type. It is easy to verify
that the results are identical to those of Section 4.2. The public ﬁrm thus
attracts only the motivated workers, induces them to exert less eﬀort than
in the private sector, and extracts all of their motivational rents.
Next, consider the case where Q is suﬃciently large, such that two worker
types are needed. As in the case of observable worker types, the ﬁrm prefers
to hire all of the motivated workers as they are the only workers who are
willing to work for less than p per unit of eﬀort. The interesting question is
which worker type the public ﬁrm prefers to hire in addition to the motivated
11Note that motivated workers have no incentive to underbid: their participation con-
straint is just met, whereas lazy workers earn a rent in a public sector job when wl <w m.
11workers. Total cost Z is given by:
Z = wmNm + wknk (11)
and the production constraint is given by:
emNm + eknk = Q (12)
where k ∈ {r,l}. To attract and separate the two types, the ﬁrm creates
two contracts that meet the following conditions. First, the contracts must
meet the participation constraint of both types:
IRk wk − θkC(ek) ≥ U∗
k
IRm wm + γmV (em) − θmC(em) ≥ U∗
m
Second, the contracts must meet the revelation constraints, that is, each
worker must prefer the contract designed for his type to the other contract:12
ICk wk − θkC(ek) ≥ wm − θkC(em)
ICm wm + γmV (em) − θmC(em) ≥ wk + γmV (ek) − θmC(ek)
Consider ﬁrst the case where the public ﬁrm decides to attract motivated
and regular workers, k = r. This resembles a standard adverse selection
problem, where workers diﬀer in their productivity inside the ﬁrm, but have
the same outside option (since θr = θm). As in the standard model, the
participation (or Individual Rationality) constraint of the ‘low’ type and
the revelation (or Incentive Compatibility) constraint of the ‘high’ type are
binding, while the other two constraints are non-binding (see e.g. Laﬀont
and Martimort, 2002, chapter 2). The optimisation problem of the public
ﬁrm is to minimise cost (11) with respect to em and er, subject to IRr, ICm,
and the production constraint (12). This gives the following two ﬁrst-order
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12We assume that workers choose which contract to sign after applying. If a worker had
to choose for which contract to apply, motivated workers would have to take into account
that not all workers applying for the contract designed for the other type may get a job, as
the number of applications may exceed the number of jobs. This would weaken ICm,a n d
hence further reduce the rents that motivated workers obtain. Further, we also assume
that the public ﬁrm can commit not to renegotiate the contracts after the types have been
revealed, such that the ratchet eﬀect has no bite.
12By substituting er = e∗
r into ﬁrst-order condition (14) and using (4) and (5),
the ﬁrst term drops out. Since the second term is positive, it follows that
the public ﬁrm induces the regular workers to exert less eﬀort than they do
in the private sector, er <e ∗
r. Substituting this result into equation (13),
we ﬁnd that the contract for the motivated workers is also distorted. The
public ﬁrm induces the motivated workers to exert more eﬀort than they
would do in the private sector if they would be motivated to work in the
private sector, em >e x
m.
Intuitively, as in the standard adverse selection model, the public ﬁrm
makes the contract of the regular workers less attractive to motivated work-
ers by decreasing the level of eﬀort in that contract. Thereby, it can extract
a greater part of the rents from motivation from the motivated workers.
However, this decrease in eﬀort implies that the public ﬁrm needs to hire
more regular workers to meet the production constraint, which is costly. It
can decrease these costs by increasing the eﬀort of motivated workers. In
the optimum, the cost of an additional unit of eﬀort by giving stronger in-
centives to the motivated workers is equal to the cost of an additional unit
of eﬀort by hiring an additional regular worker.13
Next, consider the case where the public ﬁrm decides to attract moti-
vated and lazy workers, k = l. If the revelation constraint of motivated
workers ICm is binding, the optimisation problem of the public ﬁrm is sim-
ilar to that above, leading to ﬁrst-order conditions (13) and (14) with r = l.
Hence, the public ﬁrm distorts both contracts by giving lazy workers weaker
incentives than private ﬁrms do, and motivated workers stronger incentives
than private ﬁrms would.
Interestingly, however, when the public ﬁrm attracts lazy workers, it
is also possible that the revelation constraint does not bind, i.e. that the
contract for lazy workers is less appealing to motivated workers than working
in the private sector.14 In this case, IRm and IRl are binding, while ICm
and ICl are non-binding. Then, the optimisation problem of the public ﬁrm
is to minimise cost (11) with respect to em and el, subject to IRl, IRm,
and the production constraint (12). This gives the following two ﬁrst-order
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13Allowing for part-time jobs in the private sector makes contract distortions less costly.
Regular workers would take a part-time job in the private sector alongside their public
sector job, thereby increasing their utility. Hence, the cost of the downward distortion for
the public ﬁrm is lower, implying that the ﬁrm can extract more rents from the motivated
workers.
14Note that this can never happen when the public ﬁrm hires regular workers rather
than lazy workers, since regular and motivated workers have the same outside option.
13By substituting el = e∗
l and using (4) and (5), we ﬁnd that the ﬁrst term
between brackets of ﬁrst-order condition (16) is zero. Hence, the public
ﬁrm sets the level of eﬀort for the lazy workers equal to their optimal level
of eﬀo r ti nt h ep r i v a t es e c t o r . O b v i o u s l y ,t h e i rw a g em u s ta l s ob ea tt h e
same level as in the private sector. Substituting this result into ﬁrst-order
condition (15) gives em = ex
m. Hence, neither contract is distorted and the
contract oﬀered to motivated workers extracts all of their rents (as IRm is
binding). Note that these contracts are identical to those in Section 4.2,
where we assumed that worker types are observable.
The ﬁnal step is to show which type of workers the public ﬁrm optimally
attracts in addition to the motivated workers. Let us start with the case
we just discussed, where the participation constraint of motivated workers
IRm is binding if the ﬁrm attracts lazy workers. Since the public ﬁrm oﬀers
the same contracts as in the case of observable types, total costs are as
low as in the case of observable types, as described by (10). Hence, the
public ﬁrm pays p per unit of eﬀort to lazy workers and extracts all of the
motivational rents from motivated workers. When, instead, the public ﬁrm
attracts regular workers, the revelation constraint of the motivated workers
is always binding. Therefore, the public ﬁrm can not extract all of the rents
from motivation. Moreover, it distorts the contract of the regular workers,
implying that the cost per unit of eﬀort of regular workers is greater than
p. Hence, total cost are lower if the public ﬁrm attracts lazy rather than
regular workers.
Next, consider the case where the revelation constraint of motivated
workers ICm is binding if the public ﬁrm attracts lazy workers. In Ap-
pendix A2, we prove that total cost Z decrease in the general work ethic of
the non-motivated worker type θk, ∂Z/∂θk < 0. Hence, besides motivated
workers, the public ﬁrm prefers to attract the economy’s laziest workers. The
intuition is straightforward. The extraction of motivational rents from mo-
tivated workers by the public ﬁrm is hampered by the revelation constraint
for motivated workers ICm. To induce motivated workers to choose the
proper contract, they must receive all rents they would obtain by choosing
the other type’s contract. A contract satisfying a lazy worker’s participation
constraint has lower wage and lower required eﬀort than a contract satisfy-
ing a regular worker’s participation constraint. Therefore, a lazy worker’s
contract is less appealing to a motivated worker than a regular worker’s
contract, implying that the public ﬁrm can extract more rents, and hence
attracts motivated workers at lower cost, if it attracts lazy workers rather
than regular workers.15
15Without motivated workers, Nm =0 , it follows from ﬁrst-order condition (14) that the
government does not distort the contract of regular or lazy workers. Then, the government
is indiﬀerent between lazy and regular workers, as both are willing to work in the public
sector for p per unit of eﬀort. Hence, the contract distortions and the preference for lazy
workers stem from the presence of motivated workers.
14It follows that the public ﬁrm can produce the same output at lower
cost by attracting lazy rather than regular workers. Moreover, the public
ﬁrm may deliberately provide weak incentives to lazy workers, implying that
lazy workers in the public sector exert less eﬀort than lazy workers who are
employed in the private sector. Hence, the laziness of civil servants may be
as i g no fc o s t - e ﬃcient government!
6S o c i a l W e l f a r e
In this section, we impose that the public ﬁrm maximises social welfare,
which we deﬁne as the sum of utilities of all workers in the economy.16
Recall that, so far, we ignored taxation as our assumption of lump-sum
taxes implies that none of the decisions by the workers or the cost-minimising
public ﬁrm are aﬀected by taxation. However, taxes do aﬀect workers’ utility
and, hence, social welfare. The total amount of taxes is simply the sum of
the wages of the public sector workers (Z). Since utility is linear in income,





i + niUi] − Z (17)
Recall that ni denotes the number of workers of type i ∈ {r,m,l} hired by





i + ni [−θiC(ei)+γiV (ei)]} (18)
Hence, the public ﬁrm maximises total utility in the private sector minus
the net cost of eﬀort in the public sector.
In Appendices A3 and A4, we prove that the optimal choice of the social
planner is identical to that of a cost-minimising public ﬁrm when eﬀort is
unveriﬁable, and when eﬀort is veriﬁable and Q is suﬃciently small, respec-
tively. Thus, when eﬀort is unveriﬁable, regular workers are least attractive
to the public ﬁrm, and lazy and motivated workers may both be the best
choice. When eﬀort is veriﬁable and Q is suﬃciently small, the public ﬁrm
attracts motivated workers, and induces them to exert a level of eﬀort smaller
than private ﬁrms do, em <e ∗
m.
6.1 Veriﬁable Eﬀort, Large Q
Suppose that Q is suﬃciently large, such that it is optimal for the public
ﬁrm to hire two types of workers. Again, the public ﬁrm prefers motivated
16We maintain the assumption that the public ﬁrm can not observe worker type. Ob-
servability does not aﬀect the results in this section, except for the minimum compensation
which is given by (8) when worker type is observable.
17Since the public ﬁrm’s output Q is ﬁxed, we can safely ignore the utility from public
goods in the optimisation problem.
15workers to regular and to lazy workers, as motivated workers derive utility





i ) − nk [U∗
k + θkC(ek)] − Nm [U∗
m + θmC(em) − γmV (em)]
(19)
where subscript k ∈ {r,l} denotes the non-motivated worker type the ﬁrm
hires. Maximising (19) with respect to em and ek, subject to production
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¤
=0 (21)
Using (4) and (5), it follows that ﬁrst-order condition (21) is zero for ek = e∗
k.
Hence, the non-motivated worker type is induced to exert the same level of
eﬀort as in the private sector. This implies that the public ﬁrm is indiﬀerent
between hiring lazy and regular workers, as both types derive the same utility
in the private and the public sector. Substituting this result into ﬁrst-order
condition (20), it follows that the eﬀort of motivated workers is (implicitly)
given by (6), the level of eﬀort motivated workers would exert in the private
sector if they would derive utility from working there, em = ex
m. Hence,
a social planner does not distort the contracts of its employees. Wages are
set such that the participation constraints IRk and IRm and the revelation
constraints ICk and ICm are all satisﬁed.18
The social welfare maximising contracts diﬀer from those oﬀered by the
cost-minimising public ﬁrm. This implies that, when the public ﬁrm max-
imises social welfare, social welfare is higher, but also that total cost and,
hence, taxes are higher. Apart from the diﬀerence in taxes, lazy and reg-
ular workers attain the same level of utility, U∗
i , in both cases. Hence, as
t a x e sa r eh i g h e r ,s o c i a lw e l f a r em a x i misation makes lazy and regular work-
ers worse oﬀ. It follows that only motivated workers beneﬁtf r o mh a v i n ga
social welfare maximising government. When motivated workers constitute
a minority in society, politicians are likely to act in the interest of lazy and
regular workers and strive for minimum cost of public goods production.
18Because utility is linear in income, the distribution of income does not aﬀect social
welfare. When the social welfare function is extended to allow for distributional concerns,
as in e.g. Boyer and Laﬀont (2003, Section 6), the public ﬁrm may distort contracts.
Then, rent extraction from motivated workers may be considered optimal for distributive
reasons. Rent extraction may also be optimal when taxes are distortionary, as in e.g.
Laﬀont and Tirole (1993). Then, the social planner trades oﬀ the ineﬃciencies arising
from taxation against the ineﬃciency of distorting the contracts of the workers in the
public sector.
167 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have shown that, in addition to workers with a public service
motivation, the public sector may prefer to hire the economy’s laziest workers
and provide them with weaker incentives than the market sector does. Even
though this reduces aggregate welfare, a majority of society may be better
oﬀ, as motivated workers can be hired at lower wage, and hence public goods
are produced at lower cost. When eﬀo r ti st oal a r g ee x t e n tu n v e r i ﬁable in
the public sector, the public sector may hire too many lazy workers as they
crowd out motivated workers.
We have restricted Q such that two worker types are suﬃcient. It is
a straightforward repetition of the analyses to allow for values of Q such
that the public ﬁrm needs all three worker types. When the diﬀerence in
general work ethic θ between lazy and regular workers is suﬃciently large,
the contract for lazy workers is not distorted, whereas the public ﬁrm distorts
the contracts for motivated and regular workers. Otherwise, the contract for
lazy workers will be distorted as well. In the limit, when Q →∞ , the public
ﬁrm does not distort any contract, as can be seen from ﬁrst-order condition
(14). When the ﬁrm needs a great number of non-motivated workers, the
costs of distorting the contract for non-motivated workers are large compared
to the beneﬁts of rent extraction from the motivated workers.
We have abstracted from interactions between the workers. Work morale,
however, may be aﬀected by the behaviour of one’s colleagues. The enthu-
siasm of coworkers may be stimulating, whereas shirking colleagues may
reduce the incentive to work (Stowe, 2002). Likewise, motivated workers
may consider the wage paid to lazy workers to be unfair given the diﬀerence
in eﬀort. Then, attracting lazy workers may be detrimental to the eﬀort
of motivated workers. Further, if the pace of production depends on the
‘weakest link’, it may not be optimal to hire lazy workers.
An interesting extension of our analysis would be to introduce careers
within the public sector. In many public agencies, job descriptions change
radically when one is moving up in the hierarchy. When, for instance, police-
men, ﬁremen, nurses, teachers, researchers, and so on, are motivated by the
work that they do, they may be reluctant to accept a management position.
How this aﬀects the incentivisation and selection of workers for both ﬁeld
and management positions is an interesting topic left for future research.
AA p p e n d i c e s
A.1 Conditions under which hiring two types of workers is
optimal
A l lc a s e s ,u n v e r i ﬁable eﬀort
Because the public ﬁrm can not induce workers to exert a certain level of
17eﬀort, it is necessary to attract a second worker type as soon as Q>N iei,
where i is the worker type the ﬁrm prefers to employ when Q is suﬃciently
low. Recall that if worker type is not observable, it might happen that the
public ﬁrm can not single out its most preferred type. Then, the public ﬁrm
always employs two worker types.
Observable types, veriﬁable eﬀort
As the marginal cost of a unit of eﬀort provided by a lazy or regular
worker is p,t h eﬁrm attracts lazy or regular workers when the marginal cost
of eﬀort by the motivated workers exceeds p.D i ﬀerentiating the participa-
tion constraint (8) of motivated workers with respect to em gives:
∂wm
∂em
= θmC0(em) − γmV 0(em) (A1)





m is deﬁned by:
θmC0(eξ
m) − γmV 0(eξ
m)=p (A2)
Note that (A2) is identical to (6). Hence, e
ξ
m = ex
m, which is the optimal
l e v e lo fe ﬀort motivated workers would exert in the private sector if they
would derive utility from working in the private sector.
Unobservable types, veriﬁable eﬀort
First, consider the case where the participation constraint of motivated
workers IRm binds when the public ﬁrm attracts lazy workers, while the
revelation constraint ICm is non-binding. Marginal cost of eﬀort when hiring
al a z yw o r k e ri sp. This implies that the public ﬁrm hires lazy workers as
soon as the marginal cost of eﬀort of motivated workers exceeds p.A st h i si s
identical to the benchmark case, the public ﬁrm attracts lazy workers when
Q>N me
ξ
m,w h e r ee
ξ
m is deﬁn e db y( A 2 )( a n d( 6 ) ) .
Next, consider the case where the revelation constraint of motivated
workers ICm binds when the public ﬁrm attracts lazy workers, while the
participation constraint IRm is non-binding. It is obvious that the public
ﬁrm attracts only motivated workers when Q ≤ Nme
ξ
m. Now consider higher
levels of Q. When the ﬁrm does not attract lazy workers, total cost can be
found by substituting the production constraint Q = Nmem and the partic-













It is easy to verify that Z1 is a continuous and convex function of Q. When,
instead, the public ﬁrm attracts both motivated and lazy workers, total
cost discontinuously increase, as the public ﬁrm can no longer extract all
motivational rents from the motivated workers. Suppose the public ﬁrm
18would not distort the contracts of its workers, el = e∗




Then, total cost when the public ﬁrm attracts both lazy and motivated
workers, Z2, is a linear function of Q, as the marginal cost of eﬀort equals
p.H e n c e ,Z1 and Z2 intersect at some level of Q>N me
ξ
m. Since the public
ﬁrm optimally distorts the contracts of its workers when it attracts both
lazy and motivated workers so as to decrease cost, the minimum level of Q
at which it is optimal to attract lazy workers is smaller than the level at
which Z1 and Z2 intersect.
Social planner, veriﬁable eﬀort
As the public ﬁrm induces lazy and regular workers to exert the same
l e v e lo fe ﬀort as in the private sector, this case is similar to the benchmark
case.
A.2 Proof that ∂Z
∂θk < 0
By substituting the production constraint (12), IRk, ICm, and (5) into total










Nm{θm[C(em) − C(ek)] − γm[V (em) − V (ek)]}











where, by the envelop theorem, all eﬀects through e∗
k, ek,a n dem are zero,
and the sign follows from ek <e ∗
k (see ﬁrst-order condition (14)).
A.3 Proof that cost-minimisation and welfare-maximisation
yield identical results when eﬀort is unveriﬁable
A cost-minimising public ﬁrm attracts the worker type that minimises Z =






i + θiC(ei) − γiV (ei)]
A welfare-maximising public ﬁrm attracts the worker type that maximises





i − θiC(ei)+γiV (ei)]
Obviously, these two optimisation problems yield the same results.
19A.4 Proof that cost-minimisation and welfare-maximisation
yield identical results when eﬀort is veriﬁable and Q is
suﬃciently small
A welfare-maximising public ﬁrm maximises (18) with respect to ei, subject
to the production constraint ni = Q/ei.T h i sg i v e sﬁrst-order condition:
−
£









which is, except for opposite signs, identical to ﬁrst-order condition (9) de-
rived in Section 4.2. Hence, the optimal contract of a welfare-maximising
public ﬁrm is identical to that of a cost-minimising public ﬁrm.
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